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ne of the key features of the U.S. economy’s slow recovery 
from the 2007-09 recession has been abnormally low bank 
lending to households and corporate businesses. Although 
demand for loans may be sluggish, much of the slowdown may stem 
from banks’ reluctance to lend. Before resuming normal lending activ-
ity, banks must first replenish capital levels that were depleted during 
the financial crisis.
Many analysts have pointed out that existing bank capital regula-
tion can contribute to banks’ reluctance to lend during recessions and 
into recoveries. That is, the capital requirements have a procyclical effect 
on lending. They make it more difficult for banks to finance loans in 
recessions when loans would help stimulate the economy. 
In response to this problem, the Dodd-Frank Financial Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) and the recent revi-
sion of the international Basel Accord, Basel III, mandated changes to 
make capital requirements countercyclical. The changes should coun-
teract the procyclical effect of capital regulation by requiring banks 
to hold higher capital ratios during booms. Thus, during downturns, 
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banks would be in a better position to absorb rising losses and sustain 
lending to support economic growth.
Whether countercyclical capital requirements will provide more 
lending in recessions depends on how they are implemented. Yet, little 
discussion among policymakers has focused on implementation. 
This article examines the primary options for implementing coun-
tercyclical capital requirements: using a fixed rule or giving the regula-
tory authorities discretion in deciding when and how to act. The first 
section discusses current capital regulation. The second section dis-
cusses the rationale for countercyclical capital requirements. The third 
section discusses the pros and cons of the rule- and discretion-based 
approaches to implementing the requirements. The analysis finds that 
the rule-based approach has more advantages than the approach based 
on discretion.
I.  BANK CAPITAL REGULATION
Banks fund their investments using deposits, other forms of debt, 
and equity capital. However, banks tend to hold little equity, which 
endangers the deposit insurance system. Ensuring that banks hold ad-
equate amounts of equity capital is one of the primary tools bank regu-
lators use to ensure the safety and soundness of individual banks. 
Why is bank capital regulated?
Banks have long played a special role in the financial system: They 
provide liquidity, credit, and payment services to households and firms.1 
Banks borrow funds from households and firms in the form of short-
term and demandable deposits (used as a storage and payment facility). 
They channel these funds in the form of long-term loans and lines of 
credit to other households and firms that need funds for consumption 
and investment.2
In addition to deposits, banks use equity capital to finance loans 
and to serve as a cushion to absorb loan losses. When a bank’s loans pay 
less than the value of their principal, equity capital absorbs the losses 
(up to its level). A bank could be made totally safe by financing itself 
with equity alone. However, such financing would eliminate the bank’s 
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Banks have a tendency to hold little equity.3 Their special functions 
of providing credit, liquidity, and payments services may require them 
to favor deposits and hold less equity than nonfinancial firms (Dia-
mond; Gorton and Pennacchi; Kashyap and others).4 Banks also have 
an incentive to hold less equity because their deposits are at least partly 
insured, and the deposit insurance premiums underprice the bank’s 
likelihood of default (Admati and others; Berger and others; Hellwig). 
With thin capital cushions, banks not only are susceptible to default, 
they may also find it profitable to engage in risky activities because they 
have little “skin in the game.” Overall, the higher risk-taking of banks is 
borne by the deposit insurer, which is ultimately liable for the insured 
deposits of failed banks. 
The tendency for banks to shift the burden of repayment to the de-
posit insurance entity creates a need for regulation to protect the deposit 
insurance system. Regulatory efforts focus on the safety and soundness 
of individual banks by ensuring that they hold adequate equity capital. 
Thus, the micro-prudential regulation of bank capital provides a capital 
cushion protecting the depositors and the deposit insurance fund.5
Current framework for micro-prudential bank capital regulation
Bank capital is usually regulated by requiring banks to meet or ex-
ceed a minimum capital requirement, which is specified by ratios of 
various measures of capital to assets. The predominant forms of capital 
are common equity; other equity instruments, such as some types of 
preferred stock; and hybrid securities that have both equity and debt 
features, such as subordinated debt and contingent capital (convertible 
bonds). Initially, capital requirements were based on a bank’s total as-
sets, but since the late 1980s, they have been based on the level and 
riskiness of a bank’s assets.
The current framework for micro-prudential bank capital regula-
tion in the United States was specified in the 1991 Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA). FDICIA was 
based on the first international accord issued by the Basel Commit-
tee for Banking Supervision in 1988. The key feature of Basel I was 
the use of risk-based capital requirements that sought to align a bank’s 
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adequately capitalized if its ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets   
exceeded a threshold of 8 percent.6 
Risk-weighted assets are calculated by assigning all assets to one of 
four different risk categories, each of which has a specified risk weight. 
For example, cash and U.S. government bonds are classified as riskless. 
With a risk weight of zero, they are excluded from total risk-weighted 
assets. At the other extreme, loans made to businesses are assigned the 
riskiest category with a 100 percent weight. 
In addition to setting minimum capital ratios, the federal banking 
supervisors have the discretion to require banks to hold more than the 
minimum requirements. Because bank supervisors are concerned with 
the overall safety and soundness of a bank, they could require a bank to 
increase its capital ratio above the minimum based on other risk factors 
discovered as part of the supervisory process, such as high concentra-
tions of loans to a specific sector of the economy. Such actions often 
occur in recessions, when loans and other assets become riskier.
In 2004, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision agreed on 
an overhaul of Basel I. Basel II was based on the assumption that in-
creasingly sophisticated methods of quantifying credit risk by banks 
could be used to determine their regulatory capital requirements. The 
new minimum capital requirements allowed banks with more complex 
balance sheets to replace the standard, fixed-risk weights of Basel I with 
weights based on the banks’ internal risk management models. The 
goal was for the capital requirements to better reflect the riskiness of 
banks by tying risk to individual assets rather than a category of assets.7
II.  A CASE FOR COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL  
REQUIREMENTS
Micro-prudential capital regulation, with its focus on the safety 
and soundness of individual banks, has a potential to amplify business 
cycles. A direct remedy for this unintended consequence is to intro-
duce countercyclical capital requirements.
The procyclicality of micro-prudential capital regulation
A key feature of the recent financial and economic crisis was a sharp 
decline in credit, which was preceded by a period of extraordinarily 
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causes, it provided support for a long-held view of many analysts and 
bank regulators that micro-prudential regulation of bank capital may 
have a procyclical effect on the business cycle—that is, capital regula-
tion may contribute to amplification of the business cycle by magnify-
ing or even inducing so-called “credit crunches” in recessions. A crunch 
in bank credit occurs when bank lending falls due to a decrease in the 
supply of loans unrelated to factors such as changes in risk-free interest 
rates or the credit quality of borrowers (Bernanke and Lown).
One way banks may comply with regulatory capital requirements 
in recessions is to decrease the supply of new loans (to new or exist-
ing borrowers). When bank loan losses start to mount, banks’ profits 
and equity levels decrease, thus lowering capital ratios. Equity levels 
may fall so low that banks would not be able to meet their capital re-
quirements if they made new loans. Therefore, rather than breach their 
capital requirements, banks decrease the supply of new loans. However, 
denying credit to otherwise-creditworthy borrowers, who could finance 
additional consumption and investment, can make the recession worse. 
The procyclical effect of micro-prudential capital regulation would 
likely amplify a recession except in two circumstances that are unlikely 
to exist. First, banks could enter the recession with sufficiently high 
capital ratios, and new lending would not endanger the banks’ ability 
to meet regulatory capital requirements. However, banks’ capital ratios 
tend to be only slightly higher than the capital requirements and thus 
do not provide a cushion for additional lending in a recession.8 The 
second condition is that, if it is not too costly, banks could raise fresh, 
or redeploy existing, capital in a recession. But because recessions tend 
to affect the whole banking sector, banks may be reluctant or find it 
extremely hard to raise capital through new equity offerings or sales of 
loans and other assets.
New equity offerings may not be attractive for two reasons.9 First, 
a bank’s share price may decline at issuance if potential new sharehold-
ers fear the bank is trying to sell new equity because it is in bad shape. 
In such a case, the bank may forgo the issuance of new equity (Myers 
and Majluf). This effect is more pronounced in a recession when the 
number of banks in poor health increases, and investors find it hard to 
distinguish between good and bad banks. Second, the bank’s sharehold-
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primarily benefits the bank’s creditors, whose claims become less risky 
after the injection of the new equity (Myers). This so-called “debt over-
hang problem” becomes more severe in a recession when depressed re-
turns on a bank’s investment make the new injection even less favorable 
for shareholders.10
Selling off existing loans and other assets also may be insufficient in 
a recession. In good times, banks use this strategy to redeploy their capi-
tal to new loans. However, in a recession, the prices of a bank’s assets 
may fall to such an extent that the bank loses money on the sales, re-
ducing equity. Asset prices may fall because the asset values are affected 
by the depressed economy. In addition, the more banks sell their assets, 
the more asset prices fall, requiring the sale of even higher volumes of 
assets to satisfy capital requirements, inducing a vicious cycle of falling 
asset prices.
The effects of capital regulation on a bank’s ability to lend in a 
recession also depend on the regulatory capital framework and rules. 
Under the Basel I capital requirements, risk weights are constant over 
the business cycle. Thus, high losses in a recession would cause capital 
ratios to drop below the regulatory minima, which would impair banks’ 
ability to lend. The negative impact on bank lending is even greater 
under Basel II because banks’ demand for regulatory capital may be 
increased. The reason is that the weights used to calculate risk-based 
capital requirements are based on internal models or external ratings, 
which reflect the rising risks in recessions (Blum and Hellwig; Kashyap 
and Stein; Repullo and Suarez; Repullo, Saurina, and Trucharte).11 
The argument for countercyclical capital requirements
Countercyclical capital regulation is intended to address the prob-
lems caused by procyclical micro-prudential capital regulation. Coun-
tercyclical regulation would increase capital ratios in normal times to 
prepare banks for absorbing losses in recessions. It could also lower 
capital ratios in recessions, boosting further banks’ ability to make new 
loans. Moreover, better capitalized banks would be more willing to raise 
fresh equity and would need to sell fewer assets to satisfy capital require-
ments in recessions.12
Countercyclical capital requirements are based on the assumption 
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booms, banks’ profits provide a source of capital from retained earn-
ings. Higher asset prices allow banks to sell their loans and other assets 
to reduce their exposure to assets subject to capital requirements. In 
good times, banks find it easier to increase their equity because uncer-
tainty about their health declines.
Countercyclical capital requirements are one of many tools used to 
implement macro-prudential financial regulation, which is intended to 
protect the health of the financial sector as a whole as opposed to pro-
viding for the safety and soundness of individual financial companies.13 
Box 1 lists the recently proposed countercyclical capital requirements 
in Basel III.
III.  IMPLEMENTING COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL 
REQUIREMENTS: RULES VS. DISCRETION
Whether countercyclical capital requirements can effectively ad-
dress the procyclical effect of micro-prudential capital requirements 
depends on how they are implemented. Implementation could follow 
either a rule-based or discretionary approach. This section explores the 
strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches. 
Why does implementation matter?
Countercyclical capital requirements can boost the ability of banks 
to lend in economic downturns. However, their impact depends on 
the timing and magnitude of their implementation. Timing refers to 
when the requirements are imposed and relaxed, and how quickly new 
minimum requirements must be met. Magnitude refers to how much 
requirements are changed. The tradeoff is that countercyclical require-
ments can help avoid a credit crunch in a recession, but their imple-
mentation may be costly. The costs will vary over the business cycle.
During the growth phases of the economy when countercyclical 
capital requirements increase required capital ratios, both the timing and 
magnitude matter. Adjusting to higher capital ratios is costly for banks, 
especially when all banks have to adjust at the same time. For that rea-
son, banks may prefer to increase their capital ratios by curtailing their   
lending—which could cause a credit crunch and reduce economic 
growth—rather than issuing new capital or selling assets. The cost in 
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time to adjust or the required adjustment in capital requirements were   
substantial. Hence, to reduce the probability of a credit crunch, the pro-
cess for implementing countercyclical capital requirements must take 
into account the time banks need to adjust their capital ratios to the new 
requirement. Giving banks enough time for adjustments would allow 
them to do so at the lowest cost in terms of current lending. 
In an economic downturn, the magnitude of countercyclical capi-
tal requirements is also important. A tradeoff exists between reducing 
the likelihood of credit crunches and increasing the likelihood of bank 
defaults. In deciding by how much the minimum capital ratio should 
be allowed to decline, regulators must weigh the benefits of maintain-
ing banks’ capacity to lend against the severity of the shock to the bank-
ing sector and the increased likelihood of bank defaults. If capital re-
quirements are not decreased enough, they may fail to prevent a credit 
crunch. If they are decreased too much, banks’ survival may be at risk.14
When deciding when to relax the countercyclical requirement, the 
timing has to be such that the authority understands the potential for 
a credit crunch. On the one hand, the timing does not matter for the 
banks because the downward adjustment of their capital ratios is not 
costly for them. On the other hand, the timing matters for the econ-
omy because waiting too long to relax the capital requirements may 
cause a credit crunch and depress economic activity, in which case it 
would be too late for an increase in bank lending to prevent a recession.
Evaluation criteria
Tradeoffs will inevitably arise when choosing the timing and the 
magnitude of countercyclical requirements. Under a rule-based ap-
proach, the timing and magnitude choices would be made automatical-
ly using a predetermined formula. Under a discretion-based approach, 
the decision maker would use judgment to decide when and to what 
extent the requirements are needed. In deciding which approach to use, 
three questions should be considered: How efficiently and effectively 
will information be used? Will implementation cause adverse incen-
tives? And, will there be communication problems?
Information. Implementing the requirements at the right time and 
pace and by the right amount requires extensive information on the 
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implementation approach should make the best use of the available 
information to minimize the probability of making errors when imple-
menting and relaxing countercyclical capital requirements.
Implementation incentives. The approach should provide a frame-
work that strikes the right balance between the ultimate goal and costs. 
In particular, because the costs are immediate and the benefits may 
materialize only in the future, regulators may be tempted not to imple-
ment the requirements when they are needed. Such a temptation for a 
decision -making authority to compromise its ultimate objective for an 
inconsistent goal is called the time-consistency problem.
Communication problems. The approach should eliminate commu-
nication problems stemming from the fact that banks and their busi-
ness partners may have different information than the regulator. For 
example, a discretionary announcement of higher capital requirements 
may reveal new information to market participants that the state of the 
economy and banks’ health is worse than they thought. Such a decline 
in market views may make it more difficult for banks to raise their 
capital ratios.
Discretionary approach
In a discretionary framework, the regulator would use judgment 
in determining when to implement the countercyclical capital require-
ments and by how much. The discretionary approach has some infor-
mational advantages but is less effective at preventing regulators from 
delaying implementation of the requirements and may have a potential 
for inducing negative market reactions at implementation. 
Information. The advantage of a discretionary approach to imple-
mentation is that the regulator is potentially able to make much greater 
use of all currently available information about the conditions of the 
banking sector, as well as the economy and capital markets. For exam-
ple, the information gathered in the process of bank supervision would 
allow the authority to understand not only the state of individual banks 
but also of the banking sector as a whole. Information on the state of 
the economy would provide better understanding of the risks to which 
the banking sector is exposed. Information about the capital markets 
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banking sector and their capacity to provide fresh equity to banks and 
to absorb asset sales.
Abundant information would allow for a better assessment of the 
lending capacity and health of the banking sector, as well as the capi-
tal markets’ ability to supply additional capital for banks in case of an 
adverse shock. The authority could then infer the amount of potential 
capital needed to prevent a credit crunch. Such knowledge would help 
the authority make an informed decision about the timing and magni-
tude of countercyclical capital requirements, in both good and bad times.
Implementation incentives. A discretionary approach to policymak-
ing is subject to the time-inconsistency problem. In the case of imple-
menting countercyclical capital requirements, the regulatory authority 
might avoid taking actions that would meet its objective of preventing 
a credit crunch in favor of meeting a more immediate objective of pro-
moting lending in good times.15 
An example helps explain the time-inconsistency problem in im-
plementing countercyclical capital requirements. Suppose an economy 
has had several quarters of economic growth accompanied by a steady 
increase in bank lending. Economic growth has allowed the banks to 
achieve profits that have translated into a steady stream of additional 
capital employed in making new loans. The authority has gathered data 
indicating that the banks have been substantially increasing loans while 
maintaining only the minimum amount of equity capital necessary to 
meet the micro-prudential regulatory capital requirements.
The authority with discretionary power must decide if and when to 
implement countercyclical capital requirements. Although an adverse 
economic shock may seem remote, the authority has enough data to 
understand that, if such a shock were to occur, it would lead to wide-
spread losses in the banking sector. Because banks’ capital ratios are 
only slightly above the capital requirements, a credit crunch would be 
likely. Consistent with its goal of reducing the probability of a credit 
crunch if a recession were to occur, the authority should increase banks’ 
capital requirements.
However, the authority may decide against raising capital require-
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limit banks’ ability to lend, reducing economic growth in the short 
term. If the authority is sufficiently biased toward promoting lending in 
good times and recession seems remote, it may decide to delay increas-
ing capital requirements. Second, the authority may face pressure from 
groups, such as politicians, that are more concerned about short-term 
economic growth. Third, the authority may find it hard to convince 
banks that higher capital requirements are necessary based only on su-
pervisory judgment. Convincing the banks of a need to finance their 
assets with a higher share of equity capital may be especially hard in 
good times when bank profits are strong and the risk of recession seems 
remote (Hoenig, 2009 and 2010).16 
An authority’s tendency not to implement countercyclical capital 
requirements may also be self-reinforcing. Banks anticipating this bias 
may thus engage in lending and capital structure strategies consistent 
only with the micro-prudential capital requirements. As a result, banks’ 
thin cushions of capital would make the authority less willing to intro-
duce countercyclical capital requirements, because their introduction 
could lead to a high cost of adjusting capital ratios for banks and poten-
tially harm their lending capacity and economic growth.
Communication problems. A discretionary approach may make the 
timing and magnitude of countercyclical capital requirements less pre-
dictable for banks and their business partners. The authority may have 
access to a different set of information than market participants—for 
example, data about the health of the economy or overall banking sec-
tor—which would be revealed indirectly only when countercyclical 
capital requirements were changed in a way unexpected by the market. 
A decision that surprises market participants may reduce banks’ 
ability to raise needed capital. An unexpected increase in capital re-
quirements may suggest that the condition of the economy or the bank-
ing sector is weaker than thought, causing a downward revision of the 
valuation of bank assets, shares, and marketable debt. As a result, fi-
nancing could become more costly for banks, precisely when they need 
to raise their capital ratios.17
Box 2 assesses a proposal for addressing these concerns—the so-called 
“constrained discretion” approach to implementation. The approach 
attempts to preserve the informational advantage and eliminate the   
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arguments suggesting that the constrained discretion approach might 
not be effective.
Rule-based approach
In a rule-based framework, the timing and level of countercyclical 
capital requirements would be tied to a certain variable or set of vari-
ables in a pre-specified formula. Capital requirements would change 
automatically whenever this variable (or set of variables) changes its val-
ue. Although implementing capital requirements under this approach 
would rely on less information than under a discretionary approach, the 
rule-based approach would eliminate adverse implementation incen-
tives and the potential for negative market reactions. 
Information. A rule determining countercyclical capital requirements 
needs to be simple. Critics argue, however, that a rule would not have 
sufficient information to determine the countercyclical capital require-
ments. Insufficient information in turn could lead to false signals about 
the need for raising or lowering countercyclical capital requirements. In 
fact, most of the research so far on the implementation of countercyclical 
capital requirements has focused on finding variables that would provide 
the most reliable signals for adjusting requirements (Box 3).18
Implementation incentives. The rule-based approach would elimi-
nate the problem of adverse implementation incentives by explicitly 
stating how capital requirements should vary over the business cycle. If 
capital requirements are determined by a fixed rule, there is no scope for 
a discretionary authority to change them to achieve a different objec-
tive, such as promoting lending in good times. Hence, the rule ensures 
that capital requirements are always consistent with their ultimate goal 
of reducing the procyclicality effect of capital regulation.19
Moreover, a rule-based approach may have an added benefit. The 
banks themselves may engage in strategies consistent with the goal of 
countercyclical capital requirements. If banks anticipate future changes 
in capital requirements, they may take them into account in their cur-
rent lending and capital structure decisions. For example, anticipating 
that relaxed lending and capital ratios could lead to an increase in capi-
tal requirements in the future, banks might build up cushions of equity 
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Communication problems. Unlike the discretionary approach, a 
rule-based approach would eliminate the potential for communication 
problems caused by the informational content of changes in capital 
requirements. Although changes in capital requirements would be un-
certain due to the uncertainty in the underlying variables, the changes 
would always be based on publicly observable information. Therefore, 
the changes would not contain additional information that could alter 
the banks’ ability to raise capital. 
IV. CONCLUSION
This article analyzes the pros and cons of rule-based versus dis-
cretion-based approaches to implementing the countercyclical capital 
requirements mandated by Dodd-Frank and Basel III. Based on this 
analysis, a rule-based approach would be more effective. 
The two advantages of a rule-based approach are that it elimi-
nates adverse implementation incentives and communication prob-
lems caused by a discretionary approach. First, a rule-based approach 
leaves no room for regulators to pursue different goals, such as pro-
moting short-term growth. Second, by tying the countercyclical capital 
requirements to a pre-specified formula, any change in banks’ capital 
requirements would not provide any new information that could harm 
banks’ ability to raise capital when required.
A rule-based approach would use less information to determine 
when and by how much capital requirements need to be changed. How-
ever, regulators would use only variables that minimize the likelihood 
of implementation errors. Thus, although a rule-based approach would 
use less information to make implementation decisions, this drawback 
should not be significant enough to offset its other advantages. As a 
result, the risk of a severe credit crunch should be lower using rules.76  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
BOX 1
BASEL III PROPOSAL FOR IMPLEMENTING  
COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
In December 2010, the Basel Committee for Banking Su-
pervision (2010) issued the final guidance for implementing 
countercyclical capital requirements. Listed below are the main 
features of the proposal:
•	 The	countercyclical	capital	requirements	are	in	the	form	of	
a buffer of 0-2.5 percent above the minimum regulatory 
capital requirements.
•	 Every	country	that	is	a	member	of	the	Basel	committee	has	
to designate an authority that would use its own judgment 
about the size of the buffer and timing of its introduction 
and release; the decision–making has to be done on the 
basis of five principles:
•	 The	buffer	should	be	implemented	only	for	the	pur-
pose of protecting the economy from potential fu-
ture losses when “excess credit growth is associated 
with an increase in systemic risk.”
•	 A	credit/GDP	ratio	should	be	a	main	variable,	signaling	
the timing and magnitude of the buffer, along with other 
variables as complementary information sources (as long 
as their influence on decision–making is explained).
•	 The	decisions	should	be	made	recognizing	that	the	
variables used may offer misleading guidance.
•	 If	needed,	changes	to	countercyclical	capital	require-
ments should be released promptly.
•	 The	 countercyclical	 capital	 requirements	 can	 be	
complemented by other macro-prudential tools.
•	 An	increase	in	the	countercyclical	capital	requirements	buffer	
must be announced 12 months in advance; a reduction in the 
requirements would immediately follow an announcement.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  77
BOX 2  
 
IS THERE A SCOPE FOR A SYSTEM OF  
“CONSTRAINED DISCRETION?”
The recent proposal by the Basel Committee on Bank Super-
vision (BCBS) presented in Box 1 suggests that countercyclical 
capital requirements could be introduced using an approach called 
constrained discretion. Under such an approach, the discretion-
ary decisions about the timing and magnitude of countercyclical   
capital requirements would be complemented with a communica-
tion strategy explaining the process of decision–making. Hence, 
while constrained discretion maintains the advantage of using a 
large body of information to make decisions, it aims to reduce the 
time–inconsistency problem and unintended consequences. 
The monetary policy framework used in many countries is 
an example of how constrained discretion works. An institution 
such as a central bank can establish its credibility as a guardian 
of price stability by being consistent in its actions and communi-
cating to the public the reasoning behind its decisions (Bernanke 
and Mishkin). Such consistency in a central bank’s actions makes 
its decisions more predictable to market participants and shows 
that the central bank is committed to maintaining price stability 
despite its discretionary authority. Finally, a central bank’s discre-
tion allows for a thorough analysis of all available data.
Establishing a system of constrained discretion for counter-
cyclical capital requirements, however, might be very difficult,   
especially because it needs to be fully effective as soon as the   
implementation approach is chosen. First, establishing the   
credibility of the authority mandated with implementing the 
countercyclical capital requirements would require a long period of 
time. Given that the events that would trigger a decision to change 
the countercyclical capital requirements probably would be rare, 
it is possible that the required credibility would not be established 
quickly enough before the next adverse shock hits the banking 78  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
sector (BCBS). Second, in contrast to the conduct of monetary 
policy, where a small number of variables such as inflation or real 
GDP growth are used to communicate the central bank’s stance, 
there are no simple indicators that would effectively communi-
cate when the regulatory authority would implement or remove 
countercyclical capital requirements (see Box 3 for a discussion 
of efforts to find good indicators). Moreover, because much of 
the information about the banking sector held by bank supervi-
sors is not available to the public, it is not possible to fully com-
municate the policy stance and eliminate uncertainty among 
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BOX 3
APPROACHES TO MEASURE AND LIMIT  
THE PRO-CYCLICALITY OF BANK CAPITAL 
REGULATION
Efforts are under way to find variables that would be best 
suited for implementing measures to reduce the procyclical   
effect of the Basel II capital requirements. The proposals can 
be grouped into the following categories: 1) changes in the 
methodology of measuring the risk of banks’ assets, 2) using   
macroeconomic variables to reduce the procyclical effect of 
micro-prudential capital regulation, and 3) using financial vari-
ables to reduce the procyclical effect. 
The first category of proposals focuses on the average risk 
of a bank’s assets through the business cycle. In this case, the 
Basel II capital requirements for a given asset or a loan remain 
constant over the business cycle. Compared to a procyclical re-
quirement, bank capital would be higher in booms when asset 
risk is relatively low and lower in recessions when asset risk is 
relatively high. 
The second category of proposals reduces the procyclical   
effect of the Basel II by increasing capital requirements in booms 
and lowering them in recessions based on macroeconomic   
indicators. Drehmann and others suggest that the deviation of 
the credit-to-GDP ratio from its trend and a measure of aggre-
gate losses could provide signals for the buildup and release of a 
countercyclical capital buffer relative to existing capital require-
ments. Repullo and others argue that the existing Basel II capital 
requirements should be augmented by a factor depending on the 
deviation of real GDP growth from its trend. 
Finally, the third category of proposals uses capital market 
variables rather than macroeconomic variables as signals for cor-
recting the Basel II capital requirements. Gordy proposes to use 
spreads for credit defaults swaps because they provide a timely, 
market-based measure of a bank’s riskiness.80  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
ENDNOTES
1A vast literature explores why banks are able to combine these different ser-
vices under one roof (see Freixas and Rochet, and Gorton and Winton for a survey). 
2As the banking industry evolved, banks have engaged increasingly in loan 
sales and loan securitization. These activities, however, do not mean that banks 
become detached from their activity of creating and absorbing credit risk. Banks 
usually retain part of the sold or securitized loans or provide guarantees in order 
to ensure investors that the loans are of stated quality. 
3On average, nonfinancial companies have ratios of equity to total assets of about 
50 percent (Admati and others). Such ratios for large bank holding companies in the 
U.S. are below 10 percent. Smaller banks have slightly higher capital ratios.
4Diamond shows that credit and liquidity functions may be provided to-
gether. The reason is that depositors discipline the bank to monitor and diversify 
its loans in order to decrease its likelihood of default. Gorton and Pennacchi claim 
that credit and payment functions may be complements. Because banks hold 
diversified loan portfolios, they offer nearly riskless deposits used for payments. 
Kashyap and others offer evidence for existence of synergies in providing liquidity 
through deposits and loan commitments. The reason is that outflows in one of 
these instruments usually are matched by inflows in the other. 
5The literature on banking regulation provides additional reasons for bank 
regulation of individual banks (Freixas and Rochet). First, regulation protects 
valuable lending relationships between borrowers and their banks that could be 
lost when banks fail. Second, regulation protects the economy from contagious 
failures in the banking system.
6To be precise, Basel I introduced two concepts of equity capital. One is “Tier 
1” equity capital, which consists of common equity, noncumulative preferred 
stock, and minority interests in consolidated subsidiaries. The other is “Tier 2” 
capital, which includes limited amounts of loan loss allowances, other preferred 
stock, subordinated debt, and hybrid securities. Banks were required to hold a 
minimum Tier 1 capital ratio of 4 percent and a combined minimum Tier 1 and 
Tier 2 capital ratio of 8 percent. In addition, U.S. bank supervisors require a 
minimum leverage ratio of 4 percent, which is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total 
unweighted assets.
7The Basel II Accord was implemented worldwide in January 2008, but its 
implementation in the United States was postponed. The Basel II Accord ap-
proach to credit risk follows an earlier amendment to the Basel I Accord from 
1996. This amendment allowed banks to use their internal risk management 
models to determine their capital requirements to account for market risk.
8Repullo and Suarez simulate banks’ capital buffers under the Basel I and II 
Accords. They show that these buffers are not high enough to prevent a credit 
crunch in recessions. Acharya and others show that in the recent 2007-09 finan-ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  81
cial crisis, banks continued to pay out dividends, which depleted their common 
equity levels.
9Acharya and others document that the president of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York noted that the banks told regulators during the recent financial 
crisis that “now it is not a good time to raise capital.”
10Acharya and others suggest that the debt overhang problem is a version of 
risk-shifting by the banks’ shareholders at the expense of its debt holders. The 
reasons are explicit and implicit guarantees of banks’ survival provided by govern-
ments and reliance on short-term unsecured funding.
11Blum and Hellwig suggested that the Basel I capital requirements may 
have a procyclical effect. Empirical evidence shows that enforcement actions by 
bank supervisors aimed at making banks stick to the Basel I capital requirements 
might have contributed to the credit crunch at the beginning of 1990s (Peek and 
Rosengren). Kashyap and Stein; Repullo and Suarez; and Repullo, Saurina and 
Trucharte argue that the Basel II capital requirements, which tend to increase 
in recessions, contribute to a credit crunch even more than the Basel I capital 
requirements.
12Better capitalized banks usually have higher value that mitigates fears of 
existing and potential shareholders about the health of the issuing bank and the 
debt overhang problem (Mehran and Thakor).
13Brunnermeier and others and Hanson and others provide and discuss a 
broad set of tools that can be used in macro-prudential regulation. In addition to 
reducing the procyclical effect of micro-prudential bank regulation, countercycli-
cal capital requirements could be used to reduce the likelihood of bank bailouts, 
the impact of asset bubbles, and the maturity transformation mismatch, all of 
which contribute to systemic risk in the banking sector.
14Kashyap and Stein propose a revision to the Basel II capital requirements 
such that the capital requirements in recessions would be lower than prudent 
levels as defined by the micro-prudential minimum. However, it is improbable 
that the bank supervisors will tolerate capital ratios below the micro-prudential 
minimum. Indeed, as Chairman Bernanke put it: “Counter-cyclical standards 
would require firms to build larger capital buffers in good times and allow them 
to be drawn down—but not below prudent levels—during more-stressed peri-
ods” (Bernanke). An alternative proposal is to make the micro-prudential minima 
vary directly with the business cycle (Repullo and others).
15The problem of time-inconsistency has been a recurrent theme in the eco-
nomic literature on policymaking. Kydland and Prescott received a Nobel Prize 
in economics for being the first to formally address this problem and to advocate 
the rule-based system as a solution.
16Such a problem is most severe when the authority has to deal with indi-
vidual banks.82  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
17By the same token, an announcement reducing countercyclical capital re-
quirement might again have negative consequences. Because such an announce-
ment might occur in a period of heightened uncertainty, it may cause a major 
disruption in the capital markets. 
18Drehmann and others describe an array of issues in finding variables that 
could be used to forecast the need for countercyclical capital requirements. 
19This is not to say that the rule-based approach should ignore the potential 
costs of implementing countercyclical capital requirements. A well-designed rule 
should minimize these costs. That is, the rule should be designed in such a way 
that the timing and magnitude help banks arrive at the desired level of the coun-
tercyclical capital requirements at the lowest cost in terms of lost lending.
20Brunnermeier and others also suggest that the rule-based approach would 
be more effective than the discretionary approach because the rule-based ap-
proach is immune to outside pressures.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2011  83
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